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Abstract: 
 
Exports of refined gasoline are exempt from Federal excise 
taxation.  Accordingly, an increase in the Federal excise tax on 
gasoline may simply increase the market price of gasoline in 
the U.S. and encourage the export of gasoline to foreign 
markets, primarily West Africa and Latin America.  Any 
reduction in negative environmental externalities from an 
increase in the Federal gasoline excise tax in the United States 
is therefore likely to be mooted (or perhaps made worse) on a 
global basis.  The Federal excise tax on gasoline appears to be 
the most regressive form of taxation when both direct and 
indirect costs are taken into account.  This article is the first to 
estimate the indirect costs (i.e., imbedded transports costs) to 
U.S. persons of a Federal gasoline and diesel taxes using data 
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey of 2012.  This article 
further updates and expands Poterba´s (1991) empirical 
calculation of the regressivity of the Federal gasoline tax based 
on direct gasoline expenditures.  Finally, this article 
recommends that the Jones Act restrictions on gasoline 
shipment between the Gulf Coast refineries and East Coast 
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I. Introduction.  
 
Much of the prior legal and economic literature on Federal 
gasoline taxation proposes a Pigovian tax approach where the 
individual American consumer is forced into paying the full 
price at the pump to account for any externalities from the 
consumption of gasoline. 5   The negative externalities can 
therefore be reduced or optimized by domestic tax policy 
alone.6  But, according to the Congressional Budget Office and 
National Research Council, the estimate of gasoline 
externalities is 26 cents per gallon, but the currently existing 
Federal and state gasoline taxes average 41 cents per gallon.7  
The combined gasoline excise taxes more than account for the 
externalities by this estimate.  Thus, not only is the gasoline tax 
not a “free lunch” to the economy, but there is an “excess 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
5 N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes:  An Open Invitation to Join the Pigou 
Club, EASTERN ECON. J. 35 (2009) (“The economics here is 
straightforward: emitting carbon into the atmosphere entails a negative 
externality.  In absence of any policy, people will emit too much.  The 
Pigovian policy response is to impose a tax on carbon emission.”); N. 
Gregory Mankiw, Gas Tax Now! Fortune Magazine (May 24, 1999); Shi-
Ling Hsu, The Politics and Psychology of Gasoline Taxes: An Empirical 
Study, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 363, at Note 2 (2010) citing William J. Baumol 
& Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy 21-23 (2d ed. 
1988). (“´Pigouvian´ is meant to describe a tax that would be consistent 
with Pigou's prescription that a tax equal to the marginal social harm from 
pollution should be imposed to provide just the right amount of disincentive 
for pollution. Alfred C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1928). Taxes 
that reflected the extent of negative externality thus became known as 
“Pigouvian” taxes.”). 
6  Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Costs of Fuel Economy 
Standards Versus a Gasoline Tax (Dec. 2003) at v. 
7 Id.  
burden” of this taxation.  As explained by Goldin (2012): 
“Commodity taxes generate excess burden by distorting 
consumers´ decisions about which goods to purchase…. The 
larger these ´avoidance costs´ the greater the tax´s excess 
burden.”8   
 
Gasoline taxes also fall disproportionately on the persons least 
able to pay.  Within the discipline of tax policy this is referred 
to generally as a “regressive” form of taxation.  Brunner-
Brown (2013) translates such tax theory into the domestic 
economic policy implications of the excise tax, (i.e., the 
“incidence” of the gasoline excise tax), as follows: 
 
Excise taxes are not the solution to 
transportation preference and automobile 
congestion because they are simply ineffective. 
Excise taxation discounts the variety of other 
externalities that affect transportation 
selection… the increased costs may impose a 
large, disproportionate burden on those least 
able to pay them…. This is not consistent with 
policy goals, but rather conflicts with optimal 
transportation mode composition.9 
 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
8 Jacob Goldin, Sales Tax Not Included:  Designing Commodity Taxes for 
Inattentive Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258, 276 (2012) (“Consumers who 
substitute away from the taxed good do not contribute to the tax's revenue; 
but, having switched their consumption to a less desirable bundle of goods 
in order to avoid the tax, they are still worse off because of the tax.”). 
9 John Andrew Brunner-Brown, Thirty Minutes or Less:  The Inelasticity of 
Commuting, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 355 (2013). 
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But, an optimal transportation analysis of economic policy 
analysis takes into account only the domestic U.S. policy 
implications of an increase in the Federal excise tax on 
gasoline.  People all over the world use gasoline – not just 
Americans.  Indeed, gasoline, diesel fuel, and other refined 
petroleum products exported out of the United States are 
exempt from the Federal excise tax. 10  As a matter of 
international tax policy, if either gasoline or crude oil is a 
commodity that can be exported to other nations, then the 
policymaker must consider both the domestic and international 
implications of a domestic excise tax on that commodity in the 
United States.11  This is especially true where the exports of 
gasoline are exempt from taxation, thereby creating a potential 
tax incentive to export gasoline (or diesel).  As it turns out, 
U.S. refiners indeed exported at least 18% of total gasoline 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
10 26 U.S.C. §§ 4081, 4083; IRS Publication 510 at 6 (“Exception. The tax 
does not apply to a sale if all of the following apply: The buyer´s principal 
place of business is not in the United States; The sale occurs as the fuel is 
delivered into a transport vessel with a capacity of at least 20,000 barrels of 
fuel; The seller is a registrant and the exporter of record; The fuel was 
exported.”); see also: Practical Law (Thomson Reuters) available at 
http://us.practicallaw.com/1-524-3130?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= (last checked 
December 8, 2014) (“Taxes on the import and export of oil and gas: USA. 
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund Tax imposed on petroleum produced in or 
imported to the US: 2009 to 2016: US $0.08 per barrel. 2017: US $0.09 per 
barrel. Tariffs on oil imports range from US$0.0525 to US$0.525 per barrel 
depending on the type of petroleum. Oil and petroleum products from some 
countries are duty-free due to trade agreements and Congressional 
programmes.”).  
11 Theo Eicher, John Mutti & Michelle Turnovsky, International Economics 
(7th ed.) (Routledge Publishing, New York, 2009) at 143.   
refined as of the year 2011.12  The anecdotal reports from 
major news agencies suggest both gasoline and U.S. crude oil 
exports may be increasing. 13   However, since the Energy 
Information Agency relies exclusively on data provided by the 
American Petroleum Institute, an exact or more up-to-date 
gasoline export data remains unavailable.   
 
Accordingly, because the prior economic analysis does not 
seem to consider the potential for export of gasoline by U.S. 
refiners to world markets without payment of the Federal 
excise tax, the “poll” of economists of Federal gasoline taxes 
may represent more fundamentally a survey of the proportion 
of economists who favor regressive domestic tax policies 
generally.14  As to Federal excise taxes in particular, such 
classic tax policy view is given anecdotally as: “Bah, let them 
drive a hybrid!”  But, several empirical studies now show that 
low-income persons are often unable to drive fuel-efficient 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
12 U.S. Energy Information Administration.  Independent Statistics and 
Analysis available at http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=687&t=10 
(“Gasoline exports were about 18% of total U.S. petroleum product exports 
in 2011…. Distillate fuel exports were about 30% of total U.S. petroleum 
product exports in 2011.”). 
13  Reuters, U.S. Refiners Export More Fuel Than Ever:  American 
Companies Export Energy Boom World-Wide (Oct. 8, 2013); The 
Washington Times, U.S. energy giants use crude oil loophole to post record 
petroleum exports (May 11, 2014).  
14 Mankiw, supra Note 1 at 21-2 (“[P]art of a US gasoline tax gets paid by 
the producers of oil, not the consumers.  This is an example of what 
economists call the optimal tariff argument…. . Some might fear these taxes 
would be particularly hard on those at the bottom of the economic ladder.  
Yet that is not necessarily the case…. The poor are far more likely than 
higher-income households to ride the bus or subway to work.”).   
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vehicles.  Chernick & Reschovsky say: “The data indicate that 
poorer families tend to drive older and less fuel efficient cars 
than families with higher incomes.”15  As West (2005) further 
explains, “poor vehicle owning households drive vehicles that 
pollute more than those owned by wealthy households.”16 
Thus, the classical tax policy view becomes the modern 
environmental law equivalent to Marie Antoinette´s supposed 
glib:  “Bah, let them eat cake!”17   
 
This article summarizes and expounds the prior literature on 
the regressive effects of gasoline taxation.  The indirect cost of 
gasoline taxation was excluded from Poterba´s (1991) seminal 
economic study. 18   Therefore, in order to generate a 
comprehensive estimate of the regressive effect of gasoline 
taxation, the indirect cost of the Federal gasoline tax must be 
calculated in addition to the direct tax expenditures paid by 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
15 Howard Chernick & Andrew Reschovsky, Who Pays the Gasoline Tax? 
50 NAT´L TAX J. 2 (1997).  
16 Sarah E. West, Equity Implications of Vehicle Emissions Taxes, 39 JRN´L 
OF TRANSPORT ECON & POL´Y 1 (2005); see also: James A. Kahn, Gasoline 
Prices and the Used Automobile Market:  A Rational Expectations Asset 
Price Approach, 101 Quart. J. Econ. 2 (1986). 
17 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1765). Confessions. (ed. Angela Scholar) (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 262 (misattributing perhaps the 
quote to Marie Antoinette “Qu’ils mangent de la brioche.“  The quote does 
appear to be correctly attributed to an unidentified contemporaneous 
princess of the period.). 
18 James M. Poterba, Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive? in “Tax Policy and 
the Economy” v. 5 (ed. David Bradford) (The MIT Press 1990), at 150 
(“This study does not attempt to analyze the distribution of indirect gasoline 
tax expenditures, i.e., the taxes that may be collected fom the retail 
distribution sector but eventually passed on to consumers.”). 
U.S. consumers of gasoline.  Such an analysis is necessary 
because diesel fuel and gasoline are used to transport many 
consumer goods.  In this article, we therefore expand and 
update the results of Poterba (1991) who applied the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey of 1985, to calculate the regressivity of 
direct gasoline expenditures by income level.  However, here 
we go beyond Poterba´s (1991) analysis and also estimate the 
indirect costs of gasoline taxation.  The indirect effects are 
found to be roughly an incremental 50% increase in the 
respective regressive effects of the gasoline expenditures by 
U.S. households from prior measurements.  Accordingly, 
comparing generally the recent calculation by Bogenschneider 
(2014) on the regressivity of payroll taxation, the gasoline tax 
appears to be the most regressive of any form of domestic 
taxation.19   
 
Finally, this article traces the tax subsidies offered in the 
Internal Revenue Code to oil producers, and compares these in 
magnitude with Federal excise tax collections.  The ability of 
U.S. refiners to export refined gasoline to foreign markets 
appears to partially moot (or reverse) both the potential 
national security and carbon reduction externality justifications 
for higher rates of Federal gasoline taxation given by numerous 
economic studies.  Nonetheless, if the policymaker considers 
these to be important policy goals, then a comparison of the 
regressive effect of gasoline taxes to the potential policy 
benefits of such tax policy is required.     
 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
19 See:  Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Effective Tax Rate of U.S. Persons by 
Income Level, 145 TAX NOTES 117 (Oct. 6, 2014). 
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As to the Federal excise tax on gasoline good policy options 
are available.  The Jones Act set strict maritime limits on the 
tankers which can be used to ship refined gasoline from the 
Gulf Coast refineries to the East Coast distribution terminals.20  
Accordingly, the cost of shipping gasoline by tanker to 
Western Africa is alleged to be less than the cost of shipment to 
the East Coast.21   The shipping cost issue is thus given as an 
explanation for the export of refined gasoline from the Gulf 
Coast.  The policy purpose of the Jones Act appears to be both 
to ensure U.S. persons are employed in the maritime transport 
of refined gasoline between U.S. ports, and also an 
environmental protection goal that tankers operating between 
U.S. ports be subject to U.S. regulation to avoid the potential of 
a gasoline spill in coastal waters.  Both of these policy goals 
are very important.  However, the recent B.P. oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico indicates any presumption that U.S. 
crewmembers may be able to implement better safety 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
20 The Merchant Marine Act, codified as 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (Oct. 6, 2006). 
21 Business Week, Are U.S. Gasoline Exports About to Goose Prices at the 
Pump? (Nov. 25, 2013) (“West Africa is also taking more U.S.-made 
fuel. Exports to Nigeria shot up to 2.7 million barrels in August. Driving 
this growth is a strange price incentive that’s largely a function of the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (known also as the Jones Act), which 
requires goods transported between U.S. ports to be carried on vessels based 
in the U.S., made in the U.S., and crewed mostly by U.S. citizens. A 
shortage of these ships has created a bizarre scenario where it’s cheaper to 
ship gasoline from Texas to Nigeria than it is to ship it to New York, or to 
Florida for that matter. ´I can ship a barrel of gasoline across the Atlantic 
for one-third the cost of shipping it to New York from Houston,´ says Fadel 
Gheit, an oil and gas analyst at Oppenheimer. Gheit estimates there are only 
28 vessels certified by the Jones Act that are allowed to ship fuel between 
U.S. ports. He calls them ´the chosen ones´.”). 
conditions is inconclusive.  The primary thesis of this paper is 
that the Jones Act should be modified to encourage the 
maritime shipment of refined gasoline from the Gulf Coast to 
the East Coast.   
 
The remaining possibility is that the shipment of refined 
gasoline from the Gulf Coast to West Africa and other 
locations did not occur because of incremental maritime 
shipping costs, but was instead done primarily for tax 
avoidance purposes.  All the data indicates the United States is 
simultaneously importing and exporting refined gasoline.  
Therefore, based on the available evidence we cannot exclude 
the possibility that the market price of gasoline in the United 
States might be higher than the market price of gasoline in 
Latin America or West Africa, but higher by less than the 
amount of the incremental Federal excise tax avoided by 
exporting the gasoline.  Thus, it appears at least possible that 
U.S. refiners are exporting gasoline to meet market demand in 
West Africa, Latin America, and other nations at the lower 
market price specifically in order to avoid the excise tax.  
Notably, the net carbon effect externalities may be negative 
depending on the efficiency of the gasoline usage abroad – 
especially if any portion of the gasoline is allowed to evaporate 
directly into the atmosphere or by spillage from open 
containers.  Under these assumptions, the tax policy options 
become multi-faceted.  Based on its current international treaty 
obligations the United States might be able to impose a tariff 
on exported gasoline to those nations receiving gasoline 
imports equivalent to the amount of the excise tax.22  However, 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
22 See generally: 19 U.S.C. §2504(a).  
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if the United States is prohibited by international treaty 
obligations from imposing such a tariff, then the “deadweight 
loss” from the excise tax on gasoline would need to be 
calculated in addition to the incremental negative externalities.   
 
 
II. An Estimation of the Indirect Regressivity of Federal 
Excise Taxes on Gasoline.  
 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey with the most current edition being that of 
2012.  No economic study exists on the imbedded diesel or 
gasoline fuel costs in consumer goods representing the indirect 
cost of diesel fuel and gasoline excise taxes.  However, Cooper 
(2014) recently published a calculation of trucking fuel costs 
by U.S. household based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
of 2010.23  Here, we update both studies to the year 2012 as set 
forth in Table 1, Column(s) 1, 2.  In addition, the methodology 
by Cooper (2014) is followed except with the indirect fuel 
costs allocated by relative household expenditures rather than 







23 Mark Cooper, Paying the Freight: The Consumer Benefits of Increasing 
the Fuel Economy of Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks, Consumer 
Federation of America (February, 2014) available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Paying-the-Freight.pdf. 
24 Id. at 4.   
 
Notes:  Indirect Gas Expenditure based on Cooper (2014) 
study with total commercial fuel expense as $234 billion (most 
recent data, 2010) allocated as a ratio of total expenses and 
expressed as a percentage of income based on actual CES 
household data for 2012.  Income is presented without income 
accruals for holdings gains.  The incidence of the indirect 
gasoline tax is assumed to fall entirely on the end consumer.   
 
Poterba (1991) published a calculation on the regressivity of 
direct gasoline expenditures based on the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey of 1985 as reproduced here in Table 2.  
The calculation is updated based on the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey of 2012.  
 
 








Income (%) (2012)  
Indirect Gas 
Expenditure / 





Percent 12.51% 8.56% 21.08% 
Second 20 
Percent 7.31% 4.52% 11.82% 
Third 20 
Percent 5.83% 2.02% 7.85% 
Fourth 20 
Percent 4.45% 2.96% 7.41% 
Highest 20 
Percent 2.53% 0.00002% 2.53% 
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Table 2. Comparison of Direct Gasoline Expenditures by 
Income Quintile 1985 vs 2012. 
 
U.S. Persons by 
Income Level: 
Direct Gas Expenditure 
/ Income (%) (1985)  
Direct Gas 
Expenditure / Income 
(%) (2012)   
Lowest 20 Percent 8.99% 12.51%  
Second 20 Percent 6.22% 7.31%  
Third 20 Percent 4.83% 5.83%  
Fourth 20 Percent 4.07% 4.45%  
Highest 20 Percent 2.98% 2.53%  
 
Notes:  Data simply updated from Poterba (1991).  Income is 
presented without income accruals for holdings gains. 
 
In each version of the Consumer Expenditure Survey from 
1985 to 2012 the lowest income persons are seen to accrue 
expenditures which exceed income.  Therefore, Poterba (1991) 
and Mankiw (2009) both cite this as justification for using a 
ratio of relative expenditures (in lieu of reported income) to 
calculate the regressivity of the excise tax on gasoline.  By 
comparing total expenditures to direct gasoline expenditures 
Poterba (1991) was therefore able to say only the middle 
income quintiles were worse off relative to the highest income 
quintiles.  The implication appears to be that low-income 
persons are receiving transfer payments not included in income 
to purchase gasoline, and therefore are not made worse off by 
the Federal excise tax.   
 
However, most transfer payments received by the poor are 
considered “income” by the Federal government and measured 
by the survey.  One exception might be “food stamps”, but 
obviously food stamps are not gas stamps.  Instead, the 
“higher” expenditures measured in the survey appear to relate 
to retired persons in the lowest income bracket spending out of 
savings in retirement.  If low-income retired persons are forced 
to use savings to buy gasoline this does not diminish the 
regressivity of a tax.  This simply changes the meaning of the 
word “regressive” from its colloquial definition.  Accordingly, 
Poterba´s (1991) relative expenditure calculation relating to 
expenditures by the elderly from savings is not presented here.   
 
 
III. Crude Oil Production Tax Subsidies versus Federal 
Excise Tax Revenues.   
 
As set forth in detail here, infra Table 3, the crude oil 
production subsidies offset approximately one-third (1/3) of the 
total Federal excise tax receipts.  The data here is a composite 
of three Joint Committee on Taxation scoring estimates and a 
General Accounting Office report some of which were 
summarized by Kolarova (2012).25  The domestic crude oil 
production level is increasing in the Upper Midwest region so 
the prior year estimates may understate the tax expenditure 
effect.  Also, domestic gasoline consumption is declining 
slightly and the most recent Excise Tax data is from the year 
1999 which would tend to overstate the tax expenditure effect.  
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
25 Temi Kolarova, Oil and Taxes: Refocusing the Tax Policy Question in the 
Aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 351 (2012).   
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The data presented here is a side-by-side comparison of the 
Federal Crude Oil Tax subsidies versus the Federal Excise Tax 
revenues.   
 
Notes: (amounts in thousands) An $0.08 per barrel Oil Spill 
Liability tax applies to Crude Oil production.  Any increase in 
production in recent years would increase the subsidy estimate.   
The Superfund trust find liability tax expired in 1995.   
 
Such data appears to indicate a possible “rule-of-thumb” is 
one-third (1/3) of total excise tax receipts are offset by the 
subsidies to the oil companies.    
IV. Estimate of Foregone Revenue on Exempt Exports 
of U.S. Gasoline.   
 
The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) provided a 
report in April, 2012, summarizing the total U.S. exports of 
petroleum products.  This report makes it possible to estimate 
the foregone revenue from the excise tax exemption on 
gasoline and diesel fuel exported out of the United States.  The 
CRS report provided as follows: 
 
U.S. oil exports, made up almost entirely of 
petroleum products, averaged 2.9 Mb/d in 2011.  
This is up from export of 1.2 Mb/d in 2005, led 
by growing export of distillates (diesel and 
related fuels) and gasoline.  More than 60% of 
U.S. exports went to countries in the Western 
Hemisphere, particularly to countries such as 
Mexico and Canada from which the U.S. 
imports crude oil.  Exports occur largely as a 
result of commercial decisions by oil market 
participants which reflect current oil market 
conditions as well as past investment in 
refining.26  
 
Based on this data an estimate of the potential (i.e., foregone) 
revenue from the failure to levy excise tax on exported 
petroleum products including gasoline, diesel and other 
condensates is presented here in Table 4, infra. 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
26 Neelesh Nerurkar, U.S. Oil Imports and Exports, Congressional Research 
Service (April 4, 2012).   
Table 3. Crude Oil Tax Subsidies versus Federal Excise Tax on Gasoline 
 
Excise Tax (gasoline & diesel):     
IRC §4081 (₵18.4 gas; ₵24.4 diesel ) (1999)  $21,236,659    
      
Income Tax Subsidies (U.S. crude oil):     
Foreign Tax Credit Disguised Royalties (§907)    ($2,550,000)  
Domestic Manufacturing Deduction (§199)    ($1,825,000)  
Oil Well Percentage Depletion (§613)   ($1,625,000) 
Last-in First-Out (LIFO) Accounting (§263)   ($860,000) 
Intangible Drilling Cost Expensing (§263)   ($650,000) 
Tertiarary Injection Expensing (§193)   ($100,000) 
Enhanced Oil Recovery Credit (§43)   ($100,000) 
 








Table 4. Estimate of Foregone Revenue from Excise Tax Exemption on 
 Exported Gasoline 
 
Barrels Millions/per day exported (CRS, 2011) 2,900,000 
 Gallons Conversion (31.5 gallons/barrel) 91,350,000 
 Annualized 33,342,750,000 
 Excise tax rate ₵20.4 (2/3 gasoline; 1/3 diesel) 6,801,921,000 
 Foregone Excise Tax: $6.8 billion 
  
An additional portion of the CRS report may provide insight 
into the failure to levy an excise tax on gasoline exports.  The 
CRS report stated: 
 
Oil Export Tariff.  Instead of prohibiting 
exports, some have suggested a federal tax, 
tariff, or duty on exports.  However, these are 
generally prohibited by Article 1, section 9, 
clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, which states 
that “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on articles 
exported from any State.” 
 
To the contrary, the U.S. Constitution obviously does not 
prevent the Federal government from levying a tax on exported 
gasoline or any petroleum product.  The provision cited 
prevents each individual state within the United States from 
levying such a tariff.   However, that is irrelevant to the Federal 
government´s power to levy the excise tax on petroleum 
products.  Also the U.S. Constitution´s prohibition on direct 
taxes does not apply to the excise tax applied on export of a 
petroleum product.  As such, it appears possible that some 
members of Congress and their staff are confused about the 
potential to tax exports of gasoline under the U.S. Constitution.   
 
 
V. Analysis of the Incidence of an Increase in Federal 
Excise Taxes on Gasoline.  
 
Much to the contrary, a significant increase in the Federal 
excise tax on gasoline without a prohibition on gasoline 
exports from the United States could become an economic and 
environmental calamity.  The incidence of the tax increase 
would fall almost entirely on U.S. consumers and producers 
thereby harming the relative competitiveness of the U.S. 
economy.27   Indeed, aggregate demand for gasoline in the 
United States would decrease.  However, gasoline refiners 
could then be expected to export an increasing proportion of 
the production of gasoline and other condensates thereby 
causing a decrease in gasoline price in foreign markets, and 
increasing the foreign demand for gasoline at the now lower 
price.  This is standard fair in any course in International 
Economics. 28   Furthermore, because the environmental 
protections are lower in some of the gasoline export markets 
the potential for environmental disaster is very real.  For 
example, it is not inconceivable to calculate unregulated 
foreign consumption of cheap gasoline to result in 
environmental damage 100 fold or 1,000 fold greater than the 
consumption of the same or greater amount of such gasoline in 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
27 See: Eicher, Mutti & Turnovsky (2009), supra Note 11.   
28 Compare: N. Gregory Mankiw, Raise the Gas Tax, Wall Street Journal 
(Oct. 20, 2006).  
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the United States.  Any open-container spillage or evaporation 
of gasoline on a wider scale is almost unthinkable from an 
environmental perspective.   
 
 
VI. On the Regressivity of Federal Excise Taxes on 
Gasoline. 
 
The regressivity of the taxation on gasoline is not a myth. 29  
The only category of taxation near to the Federal excise tax on 
gasoline in terms of regressivity is the combined payroll taxes 
paid by U.S. workers.  A direct comparison between the 
regressive effects of the gasoline tax versus the payroll tax can 
be made with Table 1 here with the tax table of 
Bogenschneider (2014) on taxes by U.S. persons generally.  A 
comparison of “regressivity” however can only be made 
specifically by pairing the data, i.e., to say the tax is regressive 
as to whom and to say whether the regressivity is increasing or 
decreasing over time.  Here, the aggregate amount of gasoline 
expenditures generally has increased roughly 50% between 
1985 and 2012 for the lowest income quintile of U.S. persons 
as a percentage of income.  However, Poterba (1991) implies 
that the gasoline tax may not be regressive, with the following: 
 
Low-expenditure households devote a smaller 
share of their budget to gasoline than do their 
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
29 Shi-Ling Hsu at 375 (2010) (“[O]ne of the persistent concerns with the 
gasoline tax has to do with its purportedly regressive nature. This is a myth, 
one that is reinforced by the “Do no harm effect” an aversion to causing 
harm, to the point that people would prefer a greater harm to occur by 
omission.”). 
counterparts in the middle of the expenditure 
distribution.  Although households in the top 
5% of the total spending distribution spend 
significantly less on gasoline (as a share of 
expenditures) than those who are less well off, 
gasoline´s expenditure share is much more 
stable across the population than the ratio of 
gasoline outlays to current income.30   
 
However, as a matter of tax policy “middle-class regressivity” 
remains “regressivity”.  There is nothing in the jurisprudence 
of tax policy to support Poterba´s (1991) assertion that tax 
policies favoring the ultra-rich are not “regressive” merely 
because the regressivity effects only accrue against the middle-
class and not the very poor.  Of course, as set forth supra, these 
statements are also grossly misleading when we take into 
account relative income levels of U.S. persons and the 
spending on gasoline by retired persons out of savings.   
 
 
VII. Conclusion.  
 
“The U.S. will remain the world’s biggest oil producer this 
year after overtaking Saudi Arabia and Russia as extraction of 
energy from shale rock spurs the nation’s economic recovery… 
U.S. production of crude oil, along with liquids separated from 
natural gas, surpassed all other countries this year with daily 
output exceeding 11 million barrels in the first quarter… U.S. 
oil output will surge to 13.1 million barrels a day in 2019 and 
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30 Poterba (1991) at 152. 
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plateau thereafter, according to the IEA, a Paris-based adviser 
to 29 nations. The country will lose its top-producer ranking at 





The tax policy debate focuses on how to offset the regressive 
effects of incremental Federal excise taxes on gasoline on low-
income persons.  Notably, the Congressional Budget Office 
issued a policy report analyzing potential means to offset 
higher gasoline taxes on low-income households.32  Strange 
(2009-10) explains: 
 
It would also be a mistake to believe that 
reduced payroll taxes alone will offset the 
regressive effect of European-style gas taxes. 
Even if a poor family does not own a car and, 
therefore, buys no gas directly, everything they 
purchase that has a transportation component 
will cost more. Unemployed poor people, or 
people working on a cash basis, would receive 
no benefit from reduced payroll taxes, and 
underemployed poor people may not make 
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31 Bloomberg News, U.S. Seen as Biggest Oil Producer After Overtaking 
Saudi Arabia (Jul 4, 2014) citing World Energy Outlook, International 
Energy Agency (Nov. 2013).   
32  Terry Dinan, Offsetting a Carbon Tax’s Costs on Low-Income 
Households, Congressional Budget Office 
Working Paper 2012-16 (2012). 
sufficient income for reduced taxes to offset 
their increased costs.33 
 
As such, there does not appear to be an “easy” Pigovian answer 
to simply shift the externality cost to the low-income 
consumers of gasoline.   Nonetheless, the United States 
Maritime Administration has the ability to grant waivers to the 
Jones Act restrictions on shipping in U.S. coastal waters.  As a 
matter of international trade, the United States would benefit 
by allowing incremental shipment of refined gasoline from the 
Gulf Coast to the East Coast distribution terminals through 
otherwise-restricted “coastal waters”.  The granting of such 
waiver to shipping operators would create an immediate 
economic gain both in the Gulf Coast and the East Coast – and, 
could increase Federal excise tax revenue under existing law.  
A global environmental windfall might also occur if we assume 
gasoline distribution in the East Coast of the United States is 
better regulated than in the export markets of West Africa and 
Latin America.   
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33 Rick Strange, Weaving a Tangled Web: The Intersection of Energy Policy 
and Broader Governmental Policies, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 51 
(2009-10).  
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